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Petra Hendriks*
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A challenge for most theoretical and computational accounts of linguistic reference is
the observation that language users vary considerably in their referential choices. Part
of the variation observed among and within language users and across tasks may be
explained from variation in the cognitive resources available to speakers and listeners.
This paper presents a computational model of reference production and comprehension
developed within the cognitive architecture ACT-R. Through simulations with this ACT-R
model, it is investigated how cognitive constraints interact with linguistic constraints and
features of the linguistic discourse in speakers’ production and listeners’ comprehension
of referring expressions in specific tasks, and how this interaction may give rise to
variation in referential choice. The ACT-R model of reference explains and predicts
variation among language users in their referential choices as a result of individual and
task-related differences in processing speed and working memory capacity. Because of
limitations in their cognitive capacities, speakers sometimes underspecify or overspecify
their referring expressions, and listeners sometimes choose incorrect referents or are
overly liberal in their interpretation of referring expressions.
Keywords: ACT-R, cognitive modeling, perspective taking, processing speed, reference comprehension,
reference production, working memory
LINGUISTIC REFERENCE
An important function of language is reference. Speakers refer to things, people, or events in the
world around them and listeners identify these referents based on the referring expressions used
by the speaker. To refer, speakers can use a variety of forms. For example, to refer to their neighbor
they could utter the indefinite noun phrase a lady who lives next door or the definite noun phrase
the lady who lives next door, refer to her by her name, use a personal pronoun such as she or her or a
reflexive pronoun such as herself. Which form a speaker decides to use depends on a large number
of factors, including the structure of the sentence and the prominence of the referent in the context
of utterance. Likewise, to interpret the referring expression uttered by the speaker, listeners can
often choose between various referents. This choice also depends on various factors.
Reference has been a central topic in many subfields of linguistics over the past decades.
Although the factors influencing speakers’ production and listeners’ comprehension of referring
expressions have been studied extensively from various angles, there does not exist a
comprehensive account of linguistic reference yet. One of the main challenges for such a
comprehensive account is the observation that speakers vary considerably in their choice of
referring expression. This variation is problematic for most theoretical and computational models
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of linguistic reference. Theoretical models of referential choice
(e.g., Gundel et al., 1993, 2012) generally attribute this variation
to the interaction of the model with general cognitive and
pragmatic factors and principles, without offering a specification
of how the variation arises. Most computational algorithms for
the generation of referring expressions are deterministic (van
Deemter et al., 2012) and therefore always generate the same
referring expression in a particular situation (but see Frank and
Goodman, 2012; van Gompel et al., 2012; Mitchell et al., 2013, for
recent probabilistic approaches). As a consequence, no variation
is produced. Even if different individual speakers are modeled
by different computational algorithms (as proposed by Dale and
Viethen, 2010), variation within speakers is not accounted for.
This paper addresses the question of how the observed
variation in speakers’ choice of referring expression and listeners’
choice of referent (which is discussed below) can be accounted
for. It is hypothesized that at least part of this variation can
be explained as resulting from the dynamic interaction between
linguistic and cognitive constraints on reference. The application
of these constraints is dependent on the cognitive capacities of
speakers and listeners. Cognitive capacities can vary between
individuals (e.g., between children and adults), but also within the
same individual (e.g., due to linguistic and cognitive development
or as an effect of the task). For example, some tasks are
cognitively more demanding than other tasks and will therefore
leave the speaker or listener with insufficient cognitive resources
to make an optimal referential choice. A promising approach
to investigate this hypothesis is by computational cognitive
modeling of linguistic reference. Using computational cognitive
modeling, models are developed that are cognitively plausible
rather than computationally optimal. Hence, they incorporate the
normal variability found in human performance.
In the next section, we discuss different types of variation
that have been observed in the psycholinguistic literature on
referential choice. Next, the cognitive architecture ACT-R is
introduced. Within this cognitive architecture, a computational
cognitive model of reference has been developed. It is shown
how this ACT-R model is able to account for speakers’
underspecification and overspecification of referring expressions
and listeners’ incorrect interpretations of referring expressions in
particular tasks.
VARIATION IN REFERENTIAL CHOICE
Psycholinguistic investigations of the referential choices made
by human speakers reveal considerable variation, both among
and within individuals and across tasks. For example, in a web-
based experiment where adult participants were asked to produce
referring expressions to describe one of three objects shown
in a picture in such a way that a friend looking at the same
picture would be able to identify the target referent, speakers
were found to show a large amount of variation in the referring
expressions they produced (Dale and Viethen, 2010). For the
same visual scene, different speakers produced different forms,
such as the blue cube, the blue cube in front of the red ball, and the
cube in front of the ball. Many of these forms were overspecific
and informationally redundant. A few were not specific enough
and failed to uniquely distinguish the target referent from the
other two objects. This illustrates that, even in the very same
task, speakers overspecify as well as underspecify their referring
expressions. Similar patterns of frequent overspecification and
some underspecification of referring expressions were found
in other psycholinguistic studies (e.g., Deutsch and Pechmann,
1982; Engelhardt et al., 2006; Koolen et al., 2011).
In addition to variation among speakers, it has been observed
that there is also variation within speakers. van Deemter
et al. (2012, p. 174) examined the data of Fukumura and van
Gompel (2010), who carried out two written sentence completion
experiments with adult participants to investigate the choice
between a pronoun and a name for a previously mentioned
referent. Van Deemter and colleagues found that the majority of
participants in the study of Fukumura and van Gompel did not
produce only pronouns or only names, but produced both types
of referring expression in at least one of the conditions of the
experiments.
Variation in speakers’ referential choices can also be observed
in more naturalistic tasks, such as telling a story. Reference
production during story telling is often investigated on the basis
of cartoon movies or picture books (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith, 1985;
Arnold et al., 2009). For example, picture stories like Figure 1
were used to elicit narratives in children, young adults and
elderly adults (Hendriks et al., 2014), and in children with autism,
children with ADHD and typically developing children (Kuijper
et al., 2015). The picture stories in these experiments featured
two characters of the same gender and were designed to elicit
two topic shifts: one halfway through the story (when the second
character enters the story) and the other one at the end of the
story (when there is a shift in focus to the first character again).
The participants were instructed to tell the story so that a second
experimenter, who could not see the pictures, would be able to
understand the story.
On the basis of the picture story in Figure 1, participants
produced narratives such as the following (from Hendriks et al.,
2014, translated from Dutch and slightly adapted for the sake of
readability):
Speaker 1: A pirate with the football. Then he kicks it. Then
it is in the water. Then the knight goes to catch it. And he has
caught the ball in a net. Now he has his ball back again.
Speaker 2: The pirate with a wooden leg has a football. He
kicks the football with his wooden leg into the pond. And cries
because he can’t reach the ball anymore. The knight sees all
that. The knight gets a net. And gets the ball out of the water
for the pirate. The pirate has a big smile because he is happy
that he has the ball back again.
The narrative produced by speaker 2 differs from the narrative
produced by speaker 1 in several respects: Speaker 2 uses
longer sentences than speaker 1 with more variation in their
structure, speaker 2 provides more information than speaker
1 and explicitly mentions causal relations between events (as,
e.g., marked by the causal connective because), and speaker 2
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FIGURE 1 | Picture story used for eliciting narratives in the studies of Hendriks et al. (2014) and Kuijper et al. (2015).
makes different referential choices than speaker 1 and uses fewer
pronouns and more full noun phrases.
One reason for the observed differences between the narratives
of the two speakers is that speaker 1 is a 6-year-old child,
while speaker 2 is a 27-year-old adult. As an adult can be
expected to have more linguistic experience than a child speaker
and also is expected to possess more cognitive resources,
this may be the reason for the longer and more elaborate
sentences and the more explicit references in the narrative
produced by speaker 2. However, suggesting a potential reason
is not the same as providing an explanation. In particular, the
observation that the two speakers differ in age does not tell
us which aspects of children’s linguistic or cognitive abilities
must develop further to result in more adult-like narrative
productions.
In addition to variation among speakers, the two narratives
also illustrate another type of variation, namely variation across
tasks. When telling a story, speakers must introduce the
characters in the story as referents in the linguistic discourse,
maintain reference to these characters when talking about their
actions, and occasionally shift the attention of the listener from
one character to the other. These actions can be considered as
separate tasks carried out by the same speaker. Crucially, these
tasks are subject to different constraints. To introduce the two
characters in the story, both speakers use a full noun phrase.
On the other hand, to continue to refer to the two characters,
the adult speaker uses pronouns as well as full noun phrases,
whereas the child speaker only uses pronouns. As the referents
of these pronouns may not always be uniquely identifiable
for a listener, these pronouns may underspecify the intended
meaning. So the adult speaker and the child speaker make
similar referential choices on the task of introducing referents,
but make different referential choices on the task of maintaining
and shifting reference. This illustrates that there is an intricate
interaction between a speaker’s linguistic and cognitive abilities
and the properties of the task.
To investigate the interaction between linguistic constraints,
cognitive constraints and task effects on referential choice,
it is useful to combine psycholinguistic experimentation with
computational modeling. Using computational modeling can
help in teasing apart the different factors involved in referential
choice and shed more light on the way they interact. This may
contribute to our understanding of why speakers overspecify
and underspecify their referring expressions and why different
speakers do so to different degrees. Also, computational modeling
may reveal how the speaker’s referential choices affect the listener.
The paper will focus on the type of referring expression and how
speakers refer (e.g., with a full noun phrase or a pronoun) and
how listeners interpret such referring expressions. Although the
speaker’s choice of what to refer to (e.g., whether to express a
causal relation between two events or not, or whether to refer to
the pirate or the knight) also is an important aspect of referential
choice, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
COMPUTATIONAL MODELING IN ACT-R
Computational modeling of language often has the practical
goal of developing computational algorithms that can be used
in natural language applications. Virtually all natural language
generation systems contain a module for generating referring
expressions (Mellish et al., 2006). Although the aim of these
systems is to be practically useful, computational models for
the generation of referring expressions are usually not evaluated
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in terms of their usefulness, but instead in terms of their
human-likeness (see Krahmer and van Deemter, 2012, for
a comprehensive survey). In particular, these computational
models aim to mimic human performance such as reflected
in the group results of behavioral studies or in the patterns
found in a corpus of written texts. For example, Kibrik and
colleagues (Kibrik et al., 2013) developed a computational model
that, using classical machine learning algorithms, determines
referential choice in discourse on the basis of multiple factors
related to properties of the referent and the discourse context.
As these factors and their weights are extracted from a corpus of
newspaper articles, they pertain to general patterns of referential
choice generated by multiple writers on multiple occasions, as
opposed to the specific referential choices made by individual
writers in particular situations. However, if speakers and writers
show variation in their referential choices, the specific patterns
produced by individual speakers or writers may differ from
the general patterns observed at the group level. Furthermore,
computational models of this type are usually evaluated on the
basis of their similarity with human oﬄine referential choice
only, rather than on the basis of human online referential
processing as well. Also, they are generally concerned with
either language production or language comprehension, but not
both.
In addition to its use in natural language applications,
computational modeling of language can also be useful for the
development of psycholinguistic theories. Regarding reference,
the aim of such computational models is to mimic human oﬄine
as well as online referential processes. Computational modeling
of language for psycholinguistic research makes it possible to
assess the completeness of a theoretical account, forces the
modeler to be precise, allows for the systematic manipulation of
factors, and makes possible the generation of novel predictions.
In this paper, we discuss a series of computational models
of reference production and comprehension that have been
implemented in the cognitive architecture ACT-R (Adaptive
Control of Thought-Rational; Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson,
2007). Computational modeling in ACT-R has the additional
advantage that ACT-R not only is a computational modeling
environment, but also is a theory of human cognition in
which detailed assumptions about cognitive processes have been
implemented that are based on a range of data from psychological
and neurocognitive experiments. As a consequence, ACT-R’s
modeling environment constrains the computational models in
such a way that the models are cognitively plausible and are
consistent with what is currently known about human cognition.
ACT-R is a hybrid architecture that combines symbolic
and subsymbolic structures and processes. Whereas the chunks
of factual information and the if-then production rules of
ACT-R are symbolic in nature, certain processes of ACT-R
are subsymbolic. When more than one production rule can
be applied, there will be competition among these rules. The
production rule with the highest expected utility will be executed.
This is a subsymbolic process that is computed on the basis
of mathematical equations weighing the costs of executing the
production rule against its benefits. Another process that is
dependent on properties at the subsymbolic level is the retrieval
of chunks from declarative memory. Whether and how fast a
chunk is retrieved depends on its activation value, which is a
function of its frequency, its recency of use, and its connections
to other chunks in memory.
A fundamental property of ACT-R is the assumption that
each operation of the model takes time to perform. Every
retrieval of a fact from declarative memory and every execution
of a production rule takes a certain amount of time. Hence,
performance of the model is limited by the time available for
the cognitive process. However, the total execution time of the
cognitive process is not simply the sum of the durations of all
constituting operations. This is because the different modules of
ACT-R can operate in parallel, although each module by itself
can only perform a single operation at a time. Thus, the duration
of a cognitive process critically depends both on the timing of
the serial processes within a module and on how the different
modules interact. Furthermore, there is some random variation
in the model, as the utilities associated with production rules and
the activation values of chunks are noisy. Therefore, to provide
specific time estimations for a cognitive process, simulations
should be run with the computational model (Anderson et al.,
2004).
An ACT-R model obtains higher processing efficiency and
performs faster by means of the ACT-R learning mechanism
of production compilation (Taatgen and Anderson, 2002).
In production compilation, two existing production rules
are integrated into one new production rule. Because fewer
production rules are needed with this new single production
rule than with the old two production rules, the result is faster
and more automatic processing. Production compilation occurs
when two existing production rules are repeatedly executed in
sequence. Ultimately, as a result of production compilation,
carrying out a cognitive task may not require retrieval of
individual chunks from memory or execution of multiple
production rules anymore, but may be done by a single general
production rule.
The predictions of an ACT-R model can be tested by
comparing the results of computational simulations of the
ACT-R model on a specific cognitive task with the results of
human participants carrying out the same task. The output
of a simulation in ACT-R consists of quantitative measures of
performance on the task and estimates of the time it takes to
perform the task. Each simulation of the model simulates the
performance of an individual participant on a task. By offering
different amounts of training, the model can also simulate the
performance of individual children of different ages (van Rij
et al., 2010). Due to the random variation present in the model,
performance of the model differs slightly during each run. Thus,
ACT-R models are non-deterministic. By running an ACT-R
model several times on the experimental items of a linguistic task,
a dataset is obtained that can be compared to – and analyzed in
the same way as – the dataset obtained from a group of human
participants on the same task.
Because of the cognitive constraints placed on computational
models in ACT-R, ACT-R can shed more light on the cognitive
processes involved in language and communication (cf. Taatgen
and Anderson, 2002; Budiu and Anderson, 2004; Lewis and
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Vasishth, 2005; Reitter et al., 2011; Guhe, 2012). In particular,
ACT-R’s assumptions regarding the duration of cognitive
operations allow us to make precise predictions about the time
course of language processing. Furthermore, ACT-R makes it
possible to integrate linguistic analyses of referential choice in the
model, implement the opposite processes of language production
and language comprehension in one and the same model, and
describe the development and processing of perspective taking
in language without additional assumptions. Cognitive modeling
in ACT-R may therefore reveal the mechanisms underlying the
observed variation in speakers’ and listeners’ referential choices.
COGNITIVE MODELING OF REFERENCE
PRODUCTION AND COMPREHENSION
In a series of studies (Hendriks et al., 2007; van Rij
et al., 2010, 2013; van Rij, 2012; Vogelzang et al., 2015),
computational models have been implemented within the
cognitive architecture ACT-R to simulate the production and
comprehension of referring expressions by adults and children.
These computational simulations focused on the type of
referring expression (definite noun phrase, overt pronoun or
null pronoun) in production and on the identification of the
referent in comprehension. The outcomes of these simulations
were compared to existing data and further simulations were run
to generate new predictions. The details of the various ACT-R
models of reference are presented below. As these models are
based on the same principles, we will refer to them as the ACT-
R model of reference, only mentioning differences between the
models when relevant. Following the presentation of the ACT-
R model of reference, it is discussed how the model explains
individual variation in reference production and comprehension
and how the model generates novel predictions that can be tested
empirically.
Performance of the ACT-R model of reference proceeds in
three steps (see Figure 2): (1) determining the topic of the
linguistic discourse on the basis of general memory principles, (2)
applying the linguistic constraints that underlie the choice and
interpretation of referring expressions, and (3) considering the
opposite perspective in communication, which provides internal
feedback to the model on the correctness of the referential choice.
These three steps are discussed in more detail below. Particular
emphasis is placed on the cognitive principles and mechanisms
that are implemented in the model and that may be relevant for
reference production and comprehension.
Step 1: Determining the Current
Discourse Topic
The first step of the ACT-R model of reference (see, e.g., van
Rij et al., 2013) consists of determining the current discourse
topic. Using the general memory principles of ACT-R, the model
incrementally builds a (simplified) representation of the linguistic
discourse during online processing. Each discourse referent that
is encountered is represented as a chunk in declarative memory
that has a certain amount of activation. Within ACT-R, the
activation of a chunk depends on its frequency of use and the
recency of the last retrieval of the chunk. The more frequently
the chunk is used, or the more recent its last retrieval, the higher
its activation. The activation of a chunk decays with time, but
is increased when the chunk is retrieved again. The discourse
referent with the highest level of activation in declarative memory
is taken to be the current discourse topic. This allows the model
to use gradient information about the activation of referents for
making discrete decisions about the linguistic effects of discourse
topicality in the next step of the model.
In addition to this mechanism of base-level activation,
ACT-R also has a mechanism of spreading activation, that
can temporarily increase the activation of a chunk. Spreading
activation reflects the usefulness of a chunk in a particular
context: chunks that are currently being processed spread
activation to connected chunks in declarative memory. In
van Rij et al.’s (2013) model, the subject of the previous
sentence is temporarily stored as goal-relevant information
and therefore spreads activation to connected chunks. This
reflects the observation that the subject of the previous
sentence is likely to be the current discourse topic (e.g., Grosz
et al., 1995). Because the referent that was mentioned as the
subject of the previous sentence becomes more activated in
comparison to other referents due to spreading activation, the
model will more often select this referent as the discourse
topic.
Building a representation of the discourse requires access
to memory resources, which can be different for different
individuals. ACT-R does not have a separate working memory
(WM) component. However, one of the ways to model WM
effects in ACT-R is through individual differences in spreading
activation (van Rij et al., 2013). The amount of spreading
FIGURE 2 | Performance of the ACT-R model of reference. Performance of the model proceeds in three steps. In production, the input is a meaning and the
output is the optimal form for expressing this meaning. In comprehension, the input is a form and the output is the optimal meaning assigned to this form.
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activation determines the ability to maintain goal-relevant
information, and differences in the total amount of spreading
activation account for individual differences in WM capacity
(Daily et al., 2001). Hence, the effects of WM capacity on
discourse processing can be modeled as resulting from differences
in the ability to maintain goal-relevant information pertaining
to the subject of the previous sentence (van Rij et al., 2013).
In the ACT-R model of reference, a high WM capacity gives
rise to a large amount of spreading activation of the chunk
representing the subject of the previous sentence. This results in
this previous subject being a determining factor in the selection of
the discourse topic. In contrast, a low WM capacity only gives rise
to a small amount of activation, resulting in no effect at all of the
subject of the previous sentence on the selection of the discourse
topic. In the latter case, frequency and recency will be the main
determinants of the discourse topic.
The mechanism of base-level activation in combination with
spreading activation implements the effects of the preceding
linguistic discourse on the prominence, or accessibility, of
discourse referents. Referents are more accessible if they are more
frequently referred to, more recently referred to, or mentioned as
the subject of the preceding sentence (cf. Givón, 1983; Ariel, 1988,
1990; Grosz et al., 1995; Arnold, 2010). Furthermore, influences
of WM capacity on the selection of the discourse topic are
predicted.
Step 2: Applying Linguistic Constraints
on Referential Choice
The second step of the ACT-R model of reference consists of
the application of linguistic constraints that restrict the choice
and interpretation of referring expressions. These linguistic
constraints and the way they interact are taken from Optimality
Theory (Prince and Smolensky, 2004) and from theoretical
analyses of referential choice in this linguistic framework.
Constraints in Optimality Theory differ from rules in rule-based
linguistic frameworks in that these constraints are formulated
as general as possible and hence can be in conflict. Crucially,
the constraints differ in strength and are violable. If two
constraints are in conflict and cannot be satisfied both, the
stronger constraint is satisfied at the cost of violating the weaker
constraint. A second difference between linguistic constraints
and linguistic rules is that, whereas linguistic rules are input-
oriented, linguistic constraints are output-oriented. Rules apply
if the input conditions are met. Constraints, on the other
hand, apply if the output has particular features. For example,
a constraint prohibiting the use of pronouns will apply if a
potential output contains a pronoun. This property of constraints
allows Optimality Theory to explain mismatches – that is,
asymmetries – between production and comprehension in child
language (Smolensky, 1996; Hendriks, 2014), as is explained
below.
To produce or interpret a referring expression, the ACT-
R model evaluates potential outputs for a particular input. In
production, the input meaning is given and potential forms
for expressing this meaning compete. On the basis of the
constraints of the grammar, the optimal form for expressing the
input meaning is selected from a set of competing forms. The
optimal form is the form that satisfies the constraints of the
grammar best. Whereas in production the input consists of a
meaning and the output is the optimal form for this meaning,
in comprehension the input consists of the form to be interpreted
and the output is the optimal meaning for this form. Determining
the optimal meaning in comprehension is subject to the same
hierarchy of constraints as in production. Thus, production and
comprehension are guided by the same grammar and only differ
in the direction of optimization (from input meaning to optimal
form versus from input form to optimal meaning).
In the ACT-R model, candidate forms, candidate meanings
and linguistic constraints are implemented as chunks in
declarative memory (see Misker and Anderson, 2003, for an
alternative approach to combining ACT-R with Optimality
Theory). Rather than determining the optimal candidate by
simultaneously comparing all candidate outputs with respect to
the complete hierarchy of constraints, as is assumed in theoretical
work in Optimality Theory (Prince and Smolensky, 2004), the
ACT-R model compares only two candidates at a time, starting
with the candidates with the highest activation. Each of these
two candidates is evaluated on the basis of only one constraint
at a time, starting with the strongest constraint. If one of the
two candidates satisfies this constraint and the other does not,
this other candidate is discarded and a new candidate is retrieved
from memory. If the two candidates both violate or satisfy the
constraint, a next constraint is retrieved. The two candidates are
then evaluated on the basis of this next constraint. By iteratively
applying this procedure (see Figure 3), given sufficient time all
candidates can be evaluated with respect to all constraints. The
optimization procedure terminates if an optimal candidate has
been found or if time is up. In the latter case, one of the two
candidates under consideration is selected at random.
Two linguistic constraints that have been argued to be
relevant for the production and comprehension of referring
expressions in discourse (e.g., Hendriks et al., 2008) are
Referential Economy (referentially less informative forms such as
pronouns are preferred to referentially more informative forms
such as full noun phrases) and ProTop (pronouns refer to the
discourse topic). The former constraint is theoretically modeled
in Optimality Theory as a family of constraints of differing
strengths prohibiting referring expressions. As the constraint
prohibiting full noun phrases is stronger than the constraint
prohibiting pronouns, it is better to use a pronoun than to use
a full noun phrase.
On the basis of these two constraints, an overall preference is
predicted for producing pronouns, even for referents that are not
highly prominent in the discourse. Furthermore, it is predicted
that all pronouns are interpreted as referring to the discourse
topic, that is, the most prominent referent in the discourse. This
asymmetric pattern in the production and comprehension of
anaphoric pronouns is consistent with the literature on children’s
use and interpretation of pronouns in discourse (e.g., Karmiloff-
Smith, 1985; Song and Fisher, 2005). For example, Karmiloff-
Smith (1985) notes that, in narrative production, 4-year-olds
produce strings of pronouns that at times refer to the main
character of the story and at other times to the subsidiary
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FIGURE 3 | Selection of the optimal candidate in the ACT-R model of reference. This process of optimization occurs in Steps 2 and 3. After retrieval of two
candidates and a constraint, the two candidates are evaluated on the basis of the constraint. This procedure is applied iteratively, retrieving new candidates and new
constraints until the optimal candidate is found or time is up. Adapted from Hendriks et al. (2007).
character, thus making reference ambiguous for the listener. On
the other hand, 3-year-olds’ comprehension of pronouns already
depends in an adult-like way on the prominence of the referents
in the linguistic discourse (Song and Fisher, 2005). So, in child
language correct production of anaphoric pronouns seems to lag
behind their correct comprehension. This particular asymmetry
between production and comprehension is predicted by the two
constraints mentioned above.
In contrast to children, adults do not show an overall
preference for producing pronouns, regardless of the discourse
context. Instead, their referential choices in production match
their referential choices in comprehension. This is the motivation
for the third step of the model, which further restricts adults’
production of anaphoric pronouns by means of perspective
taking.
For the production and comprehension of pronouns in
syntactic binding environments, such as her in the sentence
“Goldilocks washed her,” the additional syntactic constraint
Principle A is relevant. This constraint requires a reflexive to
be bound within its clause (cf. Chomsky, 1981). That is, it
requires herself in the sentence “Goldilocks washed herself ” to
be coreferential with the local subject Goldilocks. As Principle
A is stronger than the constraint from the constraint hierarchy
Referential Economy that prefers reflexives to pronouns, the
two constraints together predict that local binding is expressed
by reflexives and that reflexives are interpreted as being locally
bound. Furthermore, these constraints predict that unbound
referents are expressed by pronouns, as Principle A does not allow
reflexives to appear unbound. This pattern is indeed observed
in English-speaking children and adults. However, English-
speaking children differ from adults in their interpretation of
pronouns in syntactic binding environments. For children, such
pronouns are ambiguous and can receive a bound as well as
an unbound interpretation. That is, they take her in “Goldilocks
washed her” to be able to refer to Goldilocks too. This asymmetric
pattern is again predicted by the constraints and is generally
known as the Delay of Principle B Effect, referring to the
delayed development of object pronouns compared to reflexives
in languages such as English and Dutch (Chien and Wexler, 1990;
van Rij et al., 2010). In contrast to the asymmetry with anaphoric
pronouns discussed above, in case of object pronouns in syntactic
binding environments correct comprehension surprisingly lags
behind correct production (De Villiers et al., 2006; Spenader
et al., 2009). Because the interpretation of object pronouns is not
restricted by syntactic constraints, object pronouns are allowed to
be coreferential with the local subject. However, for adults this is
not true. Again, the third step of the model is needed to further
restrict adults’ interpretation of pronouns.
The second step of the ACT-R model of reference crucially
relies on linguistic knowledge. This implies that cross-linguistic
differences in referential choice must receive their explanation
in this part of the model. For example, the fact that in
languages such as English sentences must always have a subject,
whereas in languages such as Italian pronominal subjects can
be dropped, can be explained by a different ranking of the
same two constraints (Grimshaw and Samek-Lodovici, 1998).
The availability of the additional possibility for expressing the
subject in Italian as a null pronoun not only influences the
distribution of overt pronouns, but may also influence the way
these overt pronouns are interpreted (Vogelzang et al., 2015).
As the three steps of the model are closely connected, these
cross-linguistic differences in the constraint hierarchy and the
inventory of linguistic forms are expected to also affect the other
steps of the model.
Step 3: Considering the Opposite
Conversational Perspective
The third step of the ACT-R model of reference is the
consideration of the opposite perspective in communication.
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After an initial choice has been made by the model in Step
2, the opposite communicative perspective is taken to verify
whether this initial choice is also optimal from the opposite
perspective. In production, the model first takes the perspective
of the speaker to select a referring expression, and next takes the
opposite perspective of a listener to check whether this referring
expression is understandable for a hypothetical listener in the
(speaker’s representation of the) current linguistic discourse.
Likewise, in interpretation, the model first takes the perspective
of the listener to select a referent for the referring expression
that is encountered, and next takes the opposite perspective
of a speaker to check whether a hypothetical speaker would
indeed have chosen this expression to refer to the selected
referent in the (listener’s representation of the) current linguistic
discourse.
This mechanism of perspective taking is a serial
implementation of the algorithm of bidirectional optimization in
Optimality Theory (Blutner, 2000). Bidirectional optimization
considers all pairs of linguistic form and meaning simultaneously
and identifies the optimal pairs. It has the effect that if a form
or meaning already is part of an optimal form-meaning pair, its
use is blocked for another form-meaning pair. In the ACT-R
model, bidirectional optimization is implemented as a serial
process of perspective taking, starting with optimization from the
language user’s own perspective followed by optimization from
the opposite perspective (Hendriks et al., 2007). This two-step
process of perspective taking proceeds incrementally. That is,
perspective taking is not postponed until the end of the sentence
and also does not consider all pairs of form and meaning in
one step (as in Blutner’s bidirectional optimization algorithm),
but rather is applied online and only considers two possibilities
at a time. The extra step of optimization from the opposite
perspective proceeds in the same way as optimization from the
own perspective (as shown in Figure 3), after which the output
of the extra step of optimization is compared to the input of the
initial step of optimization (see Figure 4). If the output of the
extra step of optimization (Step 3) differs from the input of the
initial step of optimization (Step 2), the initially selected form
or meaning is discarded and the next best form or meaning is
taken as the input to the extra step of optimization. This process
is repeated iteratively until output and input match or until time
is up.
The mechanism of perspective taking thus generates internal
feedback for the model. This feedback takes the form of a
match or mismatch between the form-meaning pair resulting
from optimization from one’s own perspective and the form-
meaning pair resulting from optimization from the opposite
conversational perspective. A match results in an update of the
parameters associated with the production rules that were used,
increasing the chances that these production rules are used again
next time. Mismatches have the effect that forms whose meaning
is not recoverable for a listener and interpretations that are not
expressed with the heard form by a speaker are blocked.
Obviously, the extra step of perspective taking takes additional
time. Therefore, performing both steps (the step of the
initial selection of the form or meaning and the additional
step of perspective taking) during online production and
comprehension requires sufficient processing speed (van Rij et al.,
FIGURE 4 | Perspective taking in the ACT-R model of reference. Perspective taking involves selection of the optimal candidate from the language user’s own
perspective (Step 2), followed by selection of the optimal candidate from the opposite communicative perspective (Step 3). The output is the best candidate in Step
2 that produces the input again in Step 3.
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2010). Initially, the model is unable to complete both steps,
because this takes too much time. As a consequence, the model
is only able to complete the step of the initial selection of a
form or meaning and does not take into account the opposite
communicative perspective. In ACT-R, processes become more
efficient with linguistic experience due to the ACT-R learning
mechanism of production compilation (Taatgen and Anderson,
2002). By frequently performing the processes of reference
production and comprehension, the relevant production rules
are repeatedly carried out in sequence. Production compilation
reduces the number of production rules required for processing
and hence reduces the amount of time needed for processing.
As the model thus gradually gains more processing speed, the
model will become more likely to take into account the opposite
perspective. Eventually, through the mechanism of production
compilation the two-step process of perspective taking may turn
into a one-step selection process. Thus, it is predicted that
the ability to use perspective taking in real-time conversation
is dependent on sufficient processing speed, which in turn
is dependent on linguistic experience. Linguistic experience
increases with age as well as with frequency of the referring
expression: the older the child and the more frequent the
referring expression in the language input to the child, the more
experience the child can be expected to have with the referring
expression.
As perspective taking requires an awareness that speakers
may possess different knowledge and make different choices than
listeners, the ability of perspective taking in language may be
related to the development of a Theory of Mind (ToM). ToM
refers to the cognitive capacity to attribute mental states, such
as beliefs, desires and intentions, to oneself and others and to
understand that the mental states of others may differ from
one’s own mental states (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). First-
order ToM, the capacity to understand what another person
thinks, typically emerges in children around the age of 3 or 4
in explicit false-belief tasks (e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983).
Second-order ToM, which builds on first-order ToM and is
the capacity to understand what another person thinks about
what yet another person thinks, emerges several years later,
around the age of 6 (Perner and Wimmer, 1985). Because of
its assumed relation to ToM development, it is conceivable
that perspective taking in language only fully develops after
age 3 or 4.
The final step of perspective taking is crucial for the mature
choice between a pronoun and a full noun phrase (see Figure 5).
If the model is only able to complete the process of initial selection
of a form or meaning and is unable to complete the next process
of perspective taking, the model will produce pronouns all the
time for expressing anaphoric reference. It will do so even for
referents that are not the discourse topic. On the other hand, if
the model is able to take into account the opposite perspective
of the listener, pronouns are blocked for referents that are not
the discourse topic. As a result, the model will restrict its use
of pronouns to referents that are the discourse topic. For other
discourse referents, the model will select a full noun phrase.
Perspective taking is also crucial for the mature
comprehension of pronouns in syntactic binding environments
(see Figure 6). If the model is unable to complete the process
of perspective taking, pronouns in object position in languages
such as English will remain ambiguous and can be interpreted
as referring to the local subject. However, if the model is able to
take into account the opposite perspective of the speaker, this
FIGURE 5 | Production of referring expressions in the ACT-R mode of reference. A speaker wishing to refer to a referent that in Step 1 was found not to be
the current discourse topic (e.g., the pirate in the final picture of the story in Figure 1) preferably uses the pronoun he to refer to this referent (indicated by the solid
arrow in Step 2). Taking into account the perspective of the listener in Step 3 will reveal that he is best interpreted as the current discourse topic (indicated by the
solid arrow in the top picture in Step 3). As this referent (knight) is different from the intended referent (pirate), the pronoun is blocked as a potential form and a full
noun phrase must be selected. Adapted from Hendriks (2014).
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FIGURE 6 | Comprehension of referring expressions in the ACT-R model of reference. A listener hearing the sentence “Goldilocks washed her” in a context
that provides no referential bias (hence, Step 1 is omitted here) may select Goldilocks or some other referent as the antecedent of the pronoun her (indicated by the
two solid arrows in Step 2) and will make a random choice. If Goldilocks is selected as the antecedent of her, taking into account the perspective of the speaker in
Step 3 will reveal that reference to Goldilocks is best expressed by the reflexive herself (indicated by the solid arrow in the top picture in Step 3). As this form is
different from the heard form her, the referent Goldilocks is blocked as a potential antecedent for the pronoun her and some other referent must be selected.
Adapted from Hendriks (2014).
bound interpretation will be blocked and pronouns in object
position will be interpreted as being non-coreferential with the
local subject.
Thus, perspective taking in production and comprehension
has the effect of avoiding misunderstanding between speaker and
listener. Note that avoiding misunderstanding crucially differs
from avoiding ambiguity: producing referentially ambiguous
expressions such as pronouns is permitted by the model, as
long as the ambiguity does not result in misunderstanding
between speaker and listener in the given discourse context. Our
view of perspective taking as a crucial step in the production
and comprehension of particular linguistic expressions that is
nevertheless still difficult for children, may contribute to the
current debate about the role of perspective taking in language.
Various positions have been put forward in this debate: that
language users are initially egocentric and only adjust their
perspective when circumstances demand (e.g., Horton and
Keysar, 1996; Keysar et al., 2003), that language users are initially
egocentric because they are unable to fully discount their own
perspective (Barr, 2008), and that perspective taking is one of
many cues in language processing that is used early on (e.g.,
Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008). As pointed out by Brown-Schmidt
(2009), empirical findings have been equivocal about the online
use of perspective taking in language processing, so one of the
main challenges for models of perspective taking in language is to
account for why perspective taking sometimes constrains online
processing and sometimes does not.
Because of its direct appeal to cognitive capacities such
as WM, processing speed and ToM, which can vary among
individual speakers and listeners, the ACT-R model of reference
seems particularly suited to explain and predict different
patterns of variation in reference production and reference
comprehension. In the next section, the model’s predictions are
discussed for speakers’ underspecification and overspecification
of referring expressions and for listeners’ incorrect or overly
liberal interpretation of referring expressions.
EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING
INDIVIDUAL VARIATION
Underspecification of Referring
Expressions
As mentioned above, children prefer to use pronouns over full
noun phrases, even when referring to referents that are not the
discourse topic (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith, 1985). As these pronouns
underspecify their referent, they may cause misunderstanding for
a listener. For this reason, adult speakers generally use full noun
phrases when referring to a referent that is not the discourse
topic.
Performing simulations with the ACT-R model of reference,
we can investigate the effects of cognitive factors on reference
production and comprehension by manipulating features of the
model. van Rij (2012, Chap. 3) modeled the production of
referring expressions in a linguistic discourse and investigated the
effects of WM on the performance of the model. The performance
of two variants of this model was compared: a model with
a low WM capacity and a model with a high WM capacity
(implemented by spreading activation). In the simulations run
with the models, the models were presented with stories of five
sentences each about two referents of the same gender, similar
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to the narratives produced by children and adults for the picture
story in Figure 1. Each story started with the first referent being
the subject of the sentence and hence the topic of the discourse.
Halfway through the story, the topic shifted from the first to the
second referent by making this second referent the subject of that
sentence and the next one. After having presented the model with
this linguistic discourse, the task of the models was to produce a
referring expression to refer back to the first referent, which at
that point in the discourse was not the topic anymore.
The low WM capacity model produced underspecified
pronouns to refer back to the first referent in 86% of the cases,
and produced explicit full noun phrases in the remaining 14%
of the cases. In contrast, the high WM capacity model produced
pronouns in only 11% of the cases and full noun phrases in the
large majority of cases, namely 88%. The performance of the low
WM capacity model reflects the performance of the children in
the study by Hendriks et al. (2014). They tested 4- to-7-year-old
Dutch-speaking children on a narrative elicitation task based on
picture stories consisting of six pictures each, such as in Figure 1.
The stories elicited a topic shift from the first referent (the pirate)
to the second referent (the knight) halfway through the story. To
re-introduce the first referent in the final picture of the story,
which is not the discourse topic anymore at the moment of re-
introduction, the children in the study produced pronouns in
62% of the cases and full noun phrases in 38% of the cases. This
preference for pronouns was in accordance with the performance
of the low WM capacity model. In contrast, the performance
of the high WM capacity model reflects the performance of the
young Dutch adults in the same study. These adults produced
pronouns in only 9% of the cases and produced full noun phrases
in 91% of the cases.
The model’s prediction that WM is a crucial factor in the
choice between a pronoun and a full noun phrase is supported
by experimental evidence from narrative elicitation studies with
various populations. Hendriks et al. (2014) found a positive
correlation between the use of full noun phrases by the children
and their scores on an auditory memory task (word repetition):
the higher the children’s memory scores, the more often they used
a full noun phrase to re-introduce the first referent. A similar
effect of WM (this time measured by an n-back task) was found
in a study with children with autism, children with ADHD and
typically developing children in the age range between 6 and
12 years old who were tested on the same narrative elicitation task
(Kuijper et al., 2015). In addition to the effect of WM, Kuijper
et al. also found an effect of second-order ToM: the higher the
children’s scores on second-order ToM (as measured by a false-
belief task), the more full noun phrases they used for referring
back to the first referent.
Inspecting the ACT-R model’s performance allows us to
more closely examine the reasons for selecting an underspecified
pronoun, in particular for the way WM and processing speed
influence this choice. Of the 86% of cases in which the low WM
capacity model produced a pronoun, in two third of these cases
(57%) this is caused by a low amount of spreading activation (van
Rij, 2012, p. 64). Due to its low amount of spreading activation,
the low WM capacity model does not take into account the
grammatical roles of referents in the local discourse. It only
relies on frequency and recency of mentioning. Hence, it shows
a strongly reduced preference for selecting the subject of the
previous sentence (the second referent) as the discourse topic.
As a result, the low WM capacity model is not very accurate
in determining the discourse topic and will often select the first
referent. If the model incorrectly selects the first referent as the
discourse topic, a pronoun is the optimal form for re-introducing
this first referent, both according to the linguistic constraints
and after considering the opposite perspective. However, for a
listener who has access to the preceding linguistic discourse and
correctly selects the second referent as the discourse topic, this
pronoun will be interpreted as referring to the second referent.
Thus, the use of a pronoun after a topic shift will result in
misunderstanding.
In addition to low WM capacity, the ACT-R model reveals a
second reason for using an underspecified pronoun after a topic
shift, namely insufficient speed of sentence processing. Of the
86% of cases in which the low WM capacity model produced
a pronoun, in one third of these cases (29%) this is caused by
insufficient processing speed (van Rij, 2012, p. 64). The linguistic
constraints lead the model to have a general preference for using
a pronoun. Only if the model succeeds in taking into account the
listener’s perspective to check the recoverability of the initially
selected form will the model block the use of a pronoun and
select a more explicit full noun phrase instead (see Figure 5). As
the completion of the process of perspective taking is dependent
on sufficient processing speed (van Rij et al., 2010), insufficient
processing speed results in the use of underspecified pronouns.
As we saw above, also less advanced ToM abilities are related
to the use of underspecified pronouns (Kuijper et al., 2015). It
is conceivable that children with less advanced ToM abilities
are slower in perspective taking, thus having insufficient time to
complete the process of perspective taking during online sentence
processing.
So, based on simulations of the ACT-R model, it can be
argued that the mature use of pronouns requires sufficient WM
capacity (which increases through maturation) and sufficient
processing speed (which increases through linguistic experience).
The observed differences between children and adults in their
production of referring expressions can thus be explained by
individual differences in their WM capacity and processing speed.
In addition to explaining existing data regarding reference
production, the ACT-R model also generates novel predictions,
that can be tested in subsequent experiments. For example, adults
with a low WM capacity but sufficient processing speed are
predicted to frequently use a pronoun to refer to a referent which
they incorrectly take to be the discourse topic, just like children.
This follows from their expected failure to use grammatical
role information from the previous sentence in determining the
discourse topic. Indeed, the elderly adults with a mean age of
almost 80 in the study of Hendriks et al. (2014), whose average
score on the memory task was significantly lower than that of
the young adults, but who can be expected to still have sufficient
processing speed, produced pronouns to re-introduce the first
referent in almost half of the cases (47%). An indication that the
elderly adults’ production of underspecified forms is due to their
low WM capacity, and is not caused by their failure in perspective
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taking, is the observation that they produced significantly more
full noun phrases when re-introducing the first referent in the
sixth picture than when referring to the second referent in the
fifth picture. This suggests that elderly adults do take the listener
into account when re-introducing the first referent (Hendriks
et al., 2014), and thus possess sufficient processing speed.
Overspecification of Referring
Expressions
Another novel prediction of the ACT-R model of reference,
one that has not been tested yet, is that particular linguistic
discourse contexts lead speakers to produce overly specific
referring expressions because of insufficient WM capacity. That
is, in these discourse contexts speakers with insufficient WM
capacity but sufficient processing speed are expected to use a full
noun phrase to refer to the discourse topic, although a pronoun
would have sufficed.
Insufficient WM capacity can occur for several reasons.
Speakers may have insufficient WM capacity due to age or
cognitive deficits. Alternatively, they may have insufficient WM
capacity available because their WM is overloaded by other
cognitive processes. This can happen when a speaker has to
carry out two or more tasks simultaneously. In ACT-R, the
effect of high cognitive load is similar to the effect of low WM
capacity (van Rij et al., 2013): due to the mechanism of spreading
activation, goal-relevant information spreads activation to other
chunks in declarative memory. If the number of sources from
which activation is spread increases, the amount of spreading
activation received by individual chunks decreases, because the
total amount of spreading activation is fixed. In a situation of
high cognitive load, more information needs to be maintained
in an activated state. Thus, more sources spread the fixed
amount of spreading activation. As a result, the subject of the
previous sentence spreads less activation to the discourse referent
associated with the subject and hence this referent is less likely to
be selected as the discourse topic.
The particular linguistic discourse contexts that are predicted
to lead speakers to overspecify their referring expressions are
contexts in which the discourse topic shifts from a more
frequently or more recently mentioned referent to a less
frequently or less recently mentioned referent. In such discourse
contexts, a speaker with sufficient WM capacity will signal the
topic shift (e.g., by expressing the new topic as a full noun phrase
in subject position) and then continue to refer to this new topic
using a pronoun. A speaker with insufficient WM capacity, on the
other hand, may continue to refer to this new topic by using a full
noun phrase. This is because the lack of sufficient WM capacity
causes the speaker to rely less on grammatical role information
from the previous sentence and more on frequency and recency
of mentioning when determining the discourse topic. If the new
topic is a less frequently or less recently mentioned referent, the
speaker may incorrectly assume that this referent has not been
established as the discourse topic yet and use a full noun phrase
to refer to this referent.
Thus, it is predicted that young adult speakers carrying
out an additional task that taxes their WM will produce
more overspecified referring expressions for reference to the
new topic immediately after a topic shift. The speaker will
continue to use such overspecified referring expressions until the
accessibility of the new discourse topic has increased by frequent
mentioning or recency. Some suggestive evidence in favor of
this prediction comes from the use of referring expressions by
adult learners of a second language. Speaking a foreign language
generally requires more cognitive resources, including WM, than
speaking the native language (e.g., Linck et al., 2013). In a
study investigating narratives produced by adult intermediate
and advanced learners of French and English when retelling a
silent cartoon movie, the adult second-language learners were
found to overspecify referring expressions compared to native
speakers of the two languages and to use definite noun phrases
where pronouns could be used (Leclercq and Lenart, 2013).
These overspecifications particularly occurred when the speakers
had to re-introduce the second character. As the two characters
appeared to be of a different gender to many of the participants,
a pronoun would have sufficed. Although Leclercq and Lenart
explain the overspecification of referring expressions in second-
language learners as a conscious risk-avoiding strategy, these
overspecifications may very well be the unconscious effects of
insufficient WM capacity.
In addition to variation in production, in particular with
respect to overspecification and underspecification, the ACT-
R model also explains variation in comprehension. Below, we
discuss some of the variation observed in adults’ and children’s
interpretations of pronouns.
Incorrect Interpretation of Referring
Expressions
Adults who have less WM capacity available because their WM
is taxed by an additional task are also more likely to select an
incorrect referent for a pronoun. In particular, they are predicted
to show difficulty comprehending a topic shift. As they are less
likely to use grammatical role information from the preceding
sentence due to the low amount of spreading activation, they
will solely rely on frequency and recency of mentioning of the
referents. In case of a topic shift, this will often result in selection
of the incorrect referent as the discourse topic and hence as the
antecedent of the pronoun.
In a dual-task experiment, van Rij et al. (2013) tested this
prediction of the ACT-R model. Adult participants had to
perform two tasks at the same time. The linguistic task was
a pronoun comprehension task. The additional task was the
memorization of a series of digits. While memorizing either three
digits (low cognitive load condition) or six digits (high cognitive
load condition), participants read short stories consisting of
four sentences. The stories featured two referents of the same
gender, which were only referred to with proper names. The final
sentence started with a potentially ambiguous subject pronoun
that could in principle refer to both referents (e.g., “He has
played soccer for twenty years”). Following the story, participants
received a comprehension question, which asked for the referent
of the pronoun. They received two types of stories: stories with
and stories without a topic shift. These two types of stories only
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differed in the grammatical roles of the referents in the second
and third sentence (subject or non-subject). In the topic-shift
stories, the topic was shifted from the most frequently mentioned
referent to the other referent by making this other referent the
subject of the second and third sentence. In the non-topic-shift
stories, the most frequently mentioned referent remained the
subject of the sentence throughout the story. After answering the
comprehension question, participants had to type in the digits
that were presented to them before the start of the story. Each
participant was tested in both cognitive load conditions.
As predicted, adults less often selected the subject of the
previous sentence as the referent of the pronoun in the high
cognitive load condition than in the low cognitive load condition.
Instead, they selected the most frequently mentioned other
referent. This effect of cognitive load was limited to stories with
a topic shift and did not affect stories without a topic shift,
which was in line with the predictions of the model. Thus, adult
listeners more often assign an incorrect interpretation to an
anaphoric pronoun under high cognitive load and select the most
frequent referent in the discourse, instead of the linguistically
most prominent referent.
Overly Liberal Interpretation of Referring
Expressions
The predictions discussed above mainly concerned WM
capacity. An exception was the prediction that, in addition
to low WM capacity, also insufficient speed of sentence
processing results in the production of underspecified pronouns
after a topic shift. Here, we discuss another prediction of
the ACT-R model concerning processing speed, namely the
prediction that insufficient processing speed results in an overly
liberal interpretation of object pronouns in syntactic binding
environments. Note that in the case of object pronouns, low
WM capacity is predicted not to have an effect, as the correct
interpretation of object pronouns is independent of the linguistic
discourse.
As mentioned above, to interpret the object pronoun her
in the sentence “Goldilocks washed her” and to restrict its
interpretation to a referent that is not the local subject, a
listener must take into account the perspective of the speaker.
Taking into account the opposite perspective in addition to
one’s own perspective is expected to take more time than only
considering one’s own perspective, as the process of perspective
taking is modeled in the ACT-R model of reference as two
consecutive processes of optimization (Hendriks et al., 2007).
Therefore, sufficient processing speed is needed to complete
the process of perspective taking. Processing speed is increased
by the ACT-R learning mechanism of production compilation,
which depends on linguistic experience. Children may not have
sufficient processing speed yet to be able to complete the process
of perspective taking within the alotted time. However, they may
be able to take into account the opposite perspective when given
more time for interpretation.
In the ACT-R model, new words arrive at a fixed rate. This
rate cannot be influenced by the listener. Therefore, time for
interpretation of a word is limited to the time until the arrival
of the next word. If the time until the next word is increased,
children have more time for the interpretation of a sentence-
internal pronoun and may be able to complete the process of
perspective taking more often. van Rij et al. (2010) carried out
a picture verification task with 4- to 7-year-old Dutch children
to test this prediction. The children received sentences such as
“The bear is tickling him with a feather” and had to say whether
the sentence matched an accompanying picture or not. As the
pronoun occurs mid-sentence, time for interpretation is limited
to the arrival of the next word. Half of the sentences were
presented to the child at a normal speech rate and the other
half at a slower speech rate of 2/3 of normal speech rate. In the
slower speech rate condition, the children had more time for
the interpretation of the pronoun due to the extra time between
words.
van Rij et al. (2010) found that, if children displayed the
Delay of Principle B Effect, slowing down the speech rate
improved their comprehension of pronouns. In contrast, slow
speech rate had a negative effect on their (already adult-like)
comprehension of reflexives. These selective beneficial effects of
slowed-down speech support the assumption implemented in the
ACT-R model that the mature interpretation of object pronouns
requires perspective taking. It is also consistent with the view
of perspective taking as an online and local process, rather than
a pragmatic and end-of-sentence process, as it is dependent on
sufficient processing speed during online sentence processing.
Based on these outcomes, it is further predicted that the
mature comprehension of object pronouns is related to advanced
ToM abilities, in the same way that avoiding to produce
underspecified pronouns after a topic shift is related to advanced
ToM abilities, as both processes are hypothesized to require
perspective taking (see Figures 5 and 6). This contrasts with the
mature comprehension of reflexives and the mature production
of pronouns in topic continuation situations, which are expected
not to be dependent on the additional step of perspective taking,
as the linguistic constraints already lead to the correct output in
these cases (Hendriks, 2014).
Another prediction that can be experimentally tested is
that features of the linguistic discourse influence the oﬄine
interpretation of object pronouns of listeners with low processing
speed, but not of listeners with high processing speed.
Perspective taking generates internal feedback, which restricts
the interpretation of object pronouns and makes this process
less dependent on the discourse (see Figure 6). As perspective
taking depends on processing speed, reduction of the influence
of the discourse also depends on processing speed. Thus, it is
expected that the linguistic discourse influences children’s oﬄine
interpretation of object pronouns, but not adults’ (although
it may influence adults’ online processing). In particular, if
the correct antecedent of the pronoun is the most frequently
and most recently mentioned referent, children will be biased
toward the correct antecedent in Step 2, whereas if an incorrect
antecedent is the most frequently and most recently mentioned
referent, children will be biased toward the incorrect antecedent
in Step 2. Without the internal feedback provided by perspective
taking in Step 3, children will stick to their initial choice
made in Step 2. Children’s overreliance on the linguistic
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discourse is predicted to disappear with increasing processing
speed.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, it was shown how computational modeling of
referential choice within the cognitive architecture ACT-R can
yield more insight into the cognitive mechanisms underlying
the observed variation in speakers’ production and listeners’
comprehension of referring expressions. The ACT-R model of
reference uses general memory principles of ACT-R to build
a representation of the linguistic discourse, employs linguistic
constraints to make an initial selection of a form or a meaning in
that discourse, and performs perspective taking to check whether
this initially selected form or meaning will indeed allow for
mutual understanding between speaker and listener in the given
discourse context. The mechanism of perspective taking does not
require any additional assumptions in ACT-R. Rather, it comes
for free to the model because comprehension is implemented
according to the same principles of optimization as production.
Perspective taking is merely modeled as the addition of an
extra step of optimization from the opposite communicative
perspective.
Because the ACT-R model of reference is based on verified
assumptions about human cognition, the model is able to
explain some of the observed variation in referential choice from
variation in speakers’ and listeners’ cognitive capacities. The
cognitive processes required for a specific referential task may
exceed the cognitive capacities of some speakers and listeners,
but not of others. Also, the cognitive processes required for some
referential tasks may be more demanding than those for other
tasks. Individual variation in the cognitive capacities of speakers
and listeners and limitations in these capacities thus give rise to
variation among and within individuals and across tasks. A first
process that is expected to require sufficient cognitive capacities
is the construction and maintenance of a representation of the
linguistic discourse. This process is predicted by the ACT-R
model to depend on the availability of sufficient WM capacity.
Another process that is expected to be effortful, as it requires an
additional step in production and comprehension, is perspective
taking. The ACT-R model predicts that perspective taking
depends on sufficient processing speed.
Hence, one source of variation in referential choice is WM
capacity. Low WM capacity is argued to lead to difficulty in taking
discourse prominence into account in building a representation
of the linguistic discourse. Therefore, low WM capacity is
expected to be involved in the production of underspecified
referential forms (cf. Vogels et al., 2014). This explains why
children and elderly adults occasionally produce pronouns
without a clear reference in their narratives. Furthermore, an
incorrect representation of the linguistic discourse due to low
WM capacity is predicted to result in errors in the interpretation
of pronouns as well. This explains children’s difficulty in
determining the correct referent of a pronoun after a topic shift as
well as adults’ child-like pattern of pronoun interpretation when
their WM is taxed by an additional task.
Another source of variation in referential choice is processing
speed. Insufficient speed of sentence processing is predicted
to lead to a failure to consider the opposite communicative
perspective. This is argued to explain children’s production of
unrecoverable pronouns in narratives as well as their overly
liberal interpretation of pronouns in object position. This
explanation of children’s non-adult-like referential choices is in
line with the view that perspective taking initially is an effortful
process that requires the adjustment of one’s own perspective
(e.g., Epley et al., 2004; Barr, 2008). In adults, due to the
ACT-R learning mechanism of production compilation, the two-
step process of perspective taking may be reduced to a one-
step selection process. This could result in perspective taking
processes becoming automatic and occurring early in adults (cf.
Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008; Brennan and Hanna, 2009).
In recent years, several probabilistic approaches have been
proposed in order to account for variation in referential choice
(e.g., Frank and Goodman, 2012; van Gompel et al., 2012;
Mitchell et al., 2013). For example, Frank and Goodman (2012)
assume that listeners interpret referring expressions as a function
of the prior probability that an object would be referred to and
the probability that the speaker would use a particular word to
refer to this object. In their approach, speakers are rational agents
who choose words that are informative in context and reduce
uncertainty about the referent. This view is criticized by Gatt
et al. (2013), who argue that the observation of overspecification
by human speakers provides evidence that speakers may not
be rational agents after all. Like Frank and Goodman’s model,
the ACT-R model of reference presented here also includes
probabilistic processes, and furthermore assumes that speakers
and listeners are rational agents. However, in contrast to Frank
and Goodman’s model, in the ACT-R model of reference perfect
rationality is not always achieved by speakers and listeners
due to limitations in their cognitive capacities. Because of its
bounded rationality, the ACT-R model occasionally gives rise to
overspecification and underspecification.
The ACT-R model of reference is not specifically geared
toward one task, but is based on general principles of human
information storage, retrieval and processing in combination
with general linguistic constraints on reference. Hence, the model
not only explains existing data, but is also able to generate
novel predictions. For example, the model predicts that speakers
who are under cognitive load will produce more overly specific
referring expressions after a topic shift. Also, it predicts that
listeners without sufficient processing speed will be influenced
in their interpretation of object pronouns by the frequencies
of referents in the linguistic discourse. These predictions can
be tested in new psycholinguistic experiments and in other
referential tasks, providing further evidence on how referential
choice varies across different tasks and among and within
individuals. For example, very little is known yet about the
decline of referential abilities in healthy elderly adults and how
this relates to their cognitive abilities. Is it true that elderly
adults’ changing performance on many cognitive tasks (including
referential tasks) does not reflect cognitive decline, but instead
reflects increased knowledge and corresponding memory search
demands, as Ramscar et al. (2014) argue? Cognitive modeling
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could help to answer this question. Also, in addition to children
and adults with autism or ADHD, other clinical populations
could be studied that have been suggested to have limitations in
their WM capacity, processing speed or both, such as patients
with Alzheimer’s disease, Broca’s aphasia, or multiple sclerosis
(e.g., Almor et al., 1999; Love et al., 2001; Piñango and Burkhardt,
2001). Studying these populations through cognitive modeling
could reveal more about reference processing in general as well
as about the cognitive deficits in these clinical populations.
The task of the ACT-R model is to make a choice between
pronouns and definite descriptions in production, and between
different discourse referents for a pronoun in comprehension.
Most computational models for the generation of referring
expressions, in contrast, focus on the choice between different
definite descriptions for a particular referent, such as between
the grey desk, the desk facing left and the gray desk facing left
(Mitchell et al., 2013). To obtain a more comprehensive model
of referential choice, the ACT-R model discussed here should be
extended to allow for these specific referential choices between
different definite descriptions as well. One proposal is by Guhe
(2012), who modeled human behavior in the so-called iMAP task
in ACT-R. In this task, participants had to reproduce a route on
a map by referring to landmarks on the map using features such
as color, number and kind (e.g., red bugs, four bugs, or four red
bugs). Guhe developed two ACT-R models of human behavior in
this task, the first one an extension of the incremental algorithm
of Dale and Reiter (1995) and the second one based on a fixed
template of features. Both cognitive models select features on
the basis of the utility of the corresponding ACT-R production
rule: production rules contributing to a successful interaction are
selected with a higher probability. Furthermore, both cognitive
models are able to adapt the utility value of features to feedback
of whether a referring expression was used successfully. While the
second model had a higher correlation with the human data, it
was more geared toward the specific task. On the other hand,
the first model was more general, but had difficulty predicting
under- and overspecified referring expressions because of its goal
to generate a uniquely distinguishing expression (for discussion,
see Guhe, 2012, p. 320). However, it may be possible to
circumvent this problem of the first model by replacing the goal
of generating a uniquely distinguishing expression by the goal
of finding a bidirectionally optimal expression, as in the ACT-R
model presented here, thus aiming at avoiding misunderstanding
rather than avoiding ambiguity. As the two models capture the
general patterns of adaptive change in referential choice that are
observed in the human data, they illustrate that modeling specific
referential choices between different definite descriptions is in
principle possible in ACT-R.
Another useful addition to the model would be the inclusion
of visual factors in the calculation of referent activation, as the
presence or absence of characters in the visual context also
affects the choice between a pronoun and a full noun phrase
(Fukumura et al., 2010). This would also be more in line
with the view that referents are bundles of multimodal features
(e.g., van der Sluis and Krahmer, 2007; van der Sluis et al.,
2008), which led van der Sluis and Krahmer (2007) to include
various types of pointing gestures in their computational model
for the generation of referring expressions. A more realistic
calculation of referent activation would also require the inclusion
of further linguistic and cognitive factors, such as coherence
relations between utterances, animacy, and first mention. As
the first two factors have been incorporated as constraints in
linguistic analyses (e.g., de Hoop, 2013; Hendriks, 2014), they
may alternatively be included in the set of linguistic constraints
implemented in the ACT-R model.
Despite these limitations, the ACT-R model of referential
choice seems to be a promising starting point for the
further exploration of factors involved in referential choice.
By running computational simulations that manipulate the
cognitive and linguistic factors implemented in the ACT-R
model, the model can generate quantitative predictions about
performance in various populations of speakers and listeners on
a variety of referential tasks. These predictions can be tested
experimentally, thus allowing us to gain further insights in the
dependence of referential choice on these cognitive and linguistic
factors.
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